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Abstract 
 
 The tragedy that occurred on September 11, 2001 changed airline security forever. Post 9/11, 
Congress gave the Department of Homeland Security vast power over passengers. This article seeks to 
examine whether the new airline security procedures are overly invasive, legal, or even effective. If the 
current system is ineffective or unconstitutional, an alternative must be sought. The Supreme Court has 
held that searches are required to be no more extensive or invasive than needed to protect security. This 
article posits that if new airline security measures are not conducted in a manner that respects the privacy 
and constitutional rights of passengers, they must be replaced with an alternative, such as behavioral 
profiling. In modern society, it is paramount that we heed the warning of Benjamin Franklin, “those who 
would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.” 
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Airport Security: Over-Reaching New Heights 
Cole Antolak* 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO AIRLINE SECURITY SCREENING 
A. Airline Security Pre 9/11 
At approximately 8:30 AM on Tuesday, September 11, 2001, nineteen men 
hijacked four transcontinental flights.1 Loaded with passengers and jet fuel, these 
men transformed passenger aircrafts into guided missiles.2 It has been speculated that 
proper security measures could have prevented this tragedy. Since 2001, airport 
security has since transformed the way we travel. 
Before 9/11 airline security was supervised by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), which was responsible for all aviation-related security 
concerns in the United States.3 Under the FAA only 5% of baggage was screened for 
explosives.4 Passengers were searched by walking through metal detectors known as 
magnetometers.5 A magnetometer produces a signal when a passenger walks through 
it with metal on their person.6 Magnetometers originally only detected ferrous 
metals, metals that contain iron, but now can also detect non-ferrous metals.7 X-ray 
machines were responsible for scanning passengers’ carry-on items.8 According to 
an FAA evaluation, bag and passenger screeners missed approximately 20% of 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Staff Editor, University of 
Pittsburgh Journal of Technology Law and Policy. 
1 Alan Taylor, 9/11: The Day of the Attacks, ATLANTIC (Sept. 8, 2011), https://www.theatlantic 
.com/photo/2011/09/911-the-day-of-the-attacks/100143. 
2 Aron Driessen, Rutget Niemeijer & Maria Nørrelund Johansen, The effectiveness of the changes 
in aviation security in the United States of America after 9/11, AVIATIONFACTS.EU (2016), http:// 
aviationfacts.eu/uploads/thema/file_en/58f65f0b70726f5be9020000/Security_US_after_9-
11_Fact_sheet.pdf. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 802 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Driessen, Niemeijer & Johansen, supra note 2. 
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potentially dangerous items.9 As a last line of defense, the FAA implemented the 
Federal Air Marshal Service in 1962.10 A Federal Air Marshal is a counter-terrorist 
agent on board a commercial aircraft to detect, deter, and defeat hostile acts targeting 
the United States.11 
B. Airline Security Post 9/11 
The attack on September 11th prompted a massive overhaul of security 
measures then used to prevent similar attacks.12 On November 19, 2001, President 
Bush signed into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.13 The 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established under this 
congressional act. Congress directed the TSA to “develop policies, strategies, and 
plans for dealing with threats to transportation security” and to “identify and 
undertake research and development activities necessary to enhance transportation 
security.”14 
Due to this overhaul, air travelers saw and experienced changes in the way they 
flew.15 For example, airlines instructed passengers to arrive at airports as much as 
two hours before takeoff for domestic flights to account for the increased security 
measures.16 After passing through security checkpoints, passengers were randomly 
selected for additional searches of their person and belongings.17 
In many cases, screening procedures have been reactive as opposed to 
proactive. For instance, following a passenger’s December 2001 attempt to light a 
bomb in his shoe, TSA agents began asking passengers to remove their shoes while 
passing through security checkpoints.18 In addition, passengers are now only allowed 
to carry on three ounce containers of liquid, because terrorists in Britain attempted 
                                                          
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyali & Daniel H. Simon, The Impact of Post-9/11 Airport Security 
Measures on the Demand for Air Travel, 50 U. CHI. PRESS J.L. & ECON. 731 (Apr. 30, 2007). 
13 Id. 
14 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(8) (2016). 
15 Ken Notis, Air Travel Since 9/11, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT. (Dec. 2005), https://www.bts.gov/ 
archive/publications/special_reports_and_issue_briefs/issue_briefs/number_13/entire. 
16 Blalock, Kadiyali & Simon, supra note 12, at 5. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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to sneak liquid explosives on planes in August 2006.19 After running numerous tests, 
federal officials determined that a container of a certain size is needed for an effective 
explosion and three ounce bottles that will fit in a quart size bag do not have enough 
“critical diameter” to cause the destruction of an aircraft.20 
Prior to 9/11, there were about 16,200 private security screeners employed at 
U.S. airports.21 By the end of 2002, TSA increased their workforce to 56,000 
screeners for passenger and baggage screening.22 TSA also drastically increased the 
occupational training for its screeners.23 Prior to 9/11, X-ray machine operators 
averaged about twelve hours of training.24 TSA currently requires over 100 hours for 
both passenger and baggage personnel.25 TSA later reduced their workforce to 
45,300 screeners by January 2004 in response to overstaffing.26 
Systematic baggage screening protocols were also implemented by the TSA.27 
Beginning on January 16, 2002, all airlines had to adopt one of the two following 
luggage screening methods: (1) positive bag matching, in which they matched each 
piece of luggage to a passenger on a flight, or; (2) screen checked baggage for 
explosives using one of four methods: explosion detection systems (EDS), explosion 
trace detection (ETD) machines, bomb-sniffing dogs, or the manual searching of 
baggage.28 EDS machines, which are about the size of a SUV, process 150-200 bags 
per hour, and produce false positives for explosives in almost 30% of bags.29 ETD 
machines are much smaller and require a screener to place a swab from each bag in 
the machine for analysis.30 All commercial U.S. airports were required by Congress 
to install EDS machines by the end of 2002.31 
                                                          
19 Joe Sharkey, Turns Out There’s a Reason for Those 3-Ounce Bottles, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/11/business/11road.html. 
20 Id. 
21 Blalock, Kadiyali & Simon, supra note 12, at 5. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 6. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Blalock, Kadiyali & Simon, supra note 12, at 5. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
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Prior to 9/11, the doors providing access to the cockpit were left unlocked.32 
After 9/11, these doors were required to be reinforced to withstand bullets and brute 
force.33 Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist.34 He is 
a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University and 
the Chief Technology Officer of IBM Resilient.35 Schneier believes that “the only 
useful airport security measure[s] since 9/11 were locking and reinforcing cockpit 
doors, so terrorists can’t break in, positive baggage matching, and teaching the 
passengers to fight back. The rest is security theater.”36 If Schneier is right in his 
opinion that much of what the TSA is doing is “security theater” are the intrusions 
we endure worth the false sense of security? 
Perhaps the most controversial and noticeable change to airport security is the 
use of advanced imaging technology (AIT). AIT can take two forms: backscatter and 
millimeter-wave.37 AIT with backscatter technology “delivers a low intensity X-ray 
onto a passenger’s body and takes a picture of the photon pattern bouncing off of 
certain materials, revealing its shape on the monitor.”38 Similarly, AIT with 
millimeter-wave technology uses “non-ionizing radiation in the radio wavelength 
area to bombard the body and record the bouncing of the waves from materials or 
objects on the body.”39 At one time, both forms of AIT were used to generate 
detailed, passenger-specific images.40 However, after resistance by travelers, the 
TSA currently utilizes only millimeter-wave AIT with automated target recognition 
                                                          
32 Barbara Peterson, Could Plane Cockpits Be Too Secure?, POPULAR MECHANICS (Mar. 19, 2014), 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a10270/in-light-of-mh370-evidence-could-plane-cockpits-be-
too-secure-16611747. 
33 Id. 
34 Bruce Schneier, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR., https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/bschneier (last updated 
May 25, 2016). 
35 Id. 
36 Christopher Elliott, The TSA has never kept you safe: here’s why, FORTUNE (June 2, 2015), http:// 
fortune.com/2015/06/02/the-tea-airport-security-problems. 
37 Victoria Sutton, Asking the Right Questions: Body Scanners, Is Salus Populi Suprme Lex the 
Answer?, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 443–44 (2013). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 444. 
40 Carol Kuruvilla, TSA has completely removed revealing X-ray scanners from America’s airports: 
rep, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 31, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/tsa-completely-
removed-full-body-scanners-rep-article-1.1360143. 
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software, which removes passenger specific pictures and instead displays the same 
generic outline for all passengers.41 
These images were once saved, but TSA has since disabled this capability on 
its units in response to pushback concerning passengers’ privacy.42 To further protect 
individuals from intrusion or embarrassment, TSA agents are not allowed to bring 
devices with photographic capacities into the screening room.43 The screening room 
is located away from the security checkpoint so that the agent monitoring the results 
does not know the subject of the scan.44 
The addition of these security measures came at a cost. In response, a 
“September 11th fee” was tacked onto all airline passenger tickets.45 In the first ten 
years the TSA collected over $15 billion.46 In 2017 alone the total fee collection was 
$3,882,602,000.47 The fee is collected by air carriers from passengers at the time air 
transportation is purchased.48 In 2014, the fee was increased from $2.50 per leg of 
the trip to $5.60 per leg.49 However, under a deal negotiated by House Speaker Paul 
Ryan, a significant portion of the additional revenue was diverted to deficit 
reduction.50 The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 authorizes the diversion of $13 
billion of passenger’s 9/11 fee to be used for deficit reduction over 10 years.51 
                                                          
41 Travel Tips: Advanced imaging technology, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-
information/advanced-imaging-technology-ait (last visited Apr. 11, 2018). 
42 Brittany R. Stancombe, Comment, Fed Up with Being Felt Up: The Complicated Relationship 
Between the Fourth Amendment and TSA’s “Body Scanners” and “Pat-Downs,” 42 CUMB. L. REV. 181, 
186 (2012). 
43 Id. 
44 Sutton, supra note 37, at 443. 
45 Jason Villemez, 9/11 to now: Ways we have changed, PBS (Sept. 14, 2011, 4:55 PM), https:// 
www.pbs.org/newshour/world/911-to-now-ways-we-have-changed. 
46 Id. 
47 Security Fees, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/security-fees (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2018). 
48 Id. 
49 Katia Hetter, TSA passenger security fee rises, CNN (July 21, 2014, 3:37 PM), http://www.cnn 
.com/2014/07/21/travel/tsa-passenger-fee-hike/index.html. 
50 Bart Jansen, Trump proposes to hike TSA fee on airline tickets, USA TODAY (Mar. 16. 2017, 
12:04 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/03/16/trump-hike-tsa-fee-airline-tickets/ 
99223062. 
51 Airlines for America Calls on Congress to Return Billions in Diverted TSA Fees to Immediately 
Address Excessive Security Lines, AIRLINES FOR AM. (May 19, 2016), http://airlines.org/news/airlines-
for-america-calls-on-congress-to-return-billions-in-diverted-tsa-fees-to-immediately-address-excessive-
security-lines. 
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Every day, TSA employees are conducting invasive searches ranging from 
patting down children as young as three years of age to inflicting harmful radiation 
onto traveler’s across the nation.52 These procedures are systematically employed 
and yet our airports are far from secure.53 USA Today reported in 2008 that 
investigators repeatedly smuggled liquid explosives and detonators past airport 
checkpoints.54 An internal TSA report also said screeners in Los Angeles and 
Chicago missed fake bombs on agents in more than 60% of tests.55 Normally this 
would beg the question, “what is a life of security worth if that life is overrun with 
constant invasions of privacy by the very government created to protect American 
security and privacy?”56 But in this case, we should ask: is the relinquishment of an 
essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, worth its intrusion? 
C. Statutory Basis for Airline Screening Procedures 
The rights of airline passengers are largely defined by Congress.57 Congress, 
under its constitutional power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States,” is given the authority over airports and airline passengers’ 
rights.58 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the congressionally 
appointed institution responsible for aviation safety.59 The Department of 
Transportation has no authority over matters related to aviation and airport security.60 
Instead, airport security is administered only by TSA, an agency of the Department 
of Homeland Security.61 
The federal statutory basis for airport security can be found in 49 U.S. Code 
§ 44901-46. Section 44901 outlines the standards for screening passengers and 
                                                          
52 Robert Poole, Airport Security, Body Scans and TSA Searches: Too Intrusive, DAILY BEAST 
(Nov. 18, 2010, 8:47 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/airport-security-body-scans-and-tsa-searches-
too-intrusive. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Jessica Hoff, Enhancing Security While Protecting Privacy: The Rights Implicated by Supposedly 
Heightened Airport Security, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1609, 1655 (2015). 
57 RACHEL TANG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43078, AIRLINE PASSENGER RIGHTS: THE FEDERAL 
ROLE IN AVIATION CONSUMER PROTECTION 1 (2016). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 3. 
60 Id. 
61 Ehsan Zaffar, What are your rights at airport screenings and checkpoints?, ELSEVIER (Sept. 11, 
2013), https://www.elsevier.com/connect/what-are-your-rights-at-airport-screenings-and-checkpoints. 
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property.62 Subsection I of § 44901 outlines the limitations on use of advanced 
imaging technology for screening passengers.63 The act defines advanced imaging 
technology as 
(i) . . . a device used in the screening of passengers that 
creates a visual image of an individual showing the 
surface of the skin and revealing other objects on the 
body; and 
(ii) May include devices using backscatter x-rays or 
millimeter waves and devices referred to as whole-body 
imaging technology or body scanning machines.64 
Section 44901(I)(2) briefly regulates the use of advanced imaging technology. This 
section states, “that any advanced imaging technology used for the screening of 
passengers must be equipped with and employs automatic target recognition 
software and complies with such other requirements as the Assistant Secretary 
determines necessary to address privacy considerations.”65 Automatic target 
recognition software is the software installed on the advanced imaging devices that 
produce a generic image of the individual being screened that is the same as the 
images being produced for all other screened individuals.66 
A variety of laws were passed in response to the events that occurred on 
September 11th.67 The FISA Amendments of 2008 allowed the Foreign Intelligence 
Court to authorize warrantless surveillance of Americans’ international electronic 
communications.68 The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 authorized “sneak and peak” 
searches.69 Sneak and peak search warrants allow the government to search your 
home or business without telling you until months later.70 These warrants are issued 
overwhelmingly in drug cases, with less than 1% used for terrorism cases.71 The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 authorized the 
                                                          
62 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a) (2016). 
63 Id. § 44901(a)(I). 
64 Id. § 44901(I)(1)(A). 
65 Id. § 44901(I)(2). 
66 Id. § 44901(I)(1)(C). 
67 Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Chart: How 9/11 Changed the Law, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 9, 2011, 
10:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/09/law-changes-from-9-11. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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Department of Homeland Security to develop a strategic plan for airport security 
measures.72 The new plan called for the TSA to improve and deploy equipment that 
detects weapons and other objects in airports using full body scanners that displayed 
an image of the passenger’s body.73 Despite continued outrage from passengers, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in July 2011 that the use of body scanners did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.74 The nature of the legislation led to a lack of 
thorough debate and consideration before voting to pass many of these laws.75 
II. HISTORICAL LEGAL CONCERNS 
When air travel was relatively new, the expectation of privacy was reduced 
because of the numerous alternative methods of travel.76 If a passenger did not want 
to be subjected to a search, they could travel by other means.77 Now that flight has 
become the standard method of transportation for long distance travel, people depend 
on air transportation and therefore, passengers are forced to endure these intrusions 
in order to continue to their destination.78 In 1974, the Second Circuit in United States 
v. Albarado defined what a typical airport frisk should encompass compared to a full 
frisk.79 The court stated, “the typical airport frisk may be more in the nature of a pat-
down, involving only the patting of external clothing in the vicinity of pockets, belts 
or shoulders where a weapon such as a gun might be secreted.”80 The court went on 
to explain that a full frisk is when an officer feels “with sensitive fingers every 
portion of the person’s body and makes a thorough search of the persons arms and 
armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface 
of the legs down to the feet.”81 Airport pat-downs have made the full transition from 
                                                          
72 Brennan Ctr. for Justice, supra note 67. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Paul Blumenthal, Congress Had No Time to Read the USA PATRIOT Act, SUNLIGHT 
FOUNDATION (Mar. 2, 2009, 2:03 PM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2009/03/02/congress-had-no-
time-to-read-the-usa-patriot-act. 
76 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973). 
77 Id. 
78 Former Miss USA Feels “Violated” by TSA Pat-Down, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2011, 6:24 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42805551/ns/travel-news/t/former-miss-usa-feels-violated-tsa-pat-
down/#.UkW6ohatqfQ. 
79 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 802 (2d Cir. 1974). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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a “typical airport frisk” to a “full frisk.”82 The change is a result of the agency’s 2015 
study that revealed that agents were failing to detect handguns and other weapons.83 
The Denver International Airport notified employees that these searches will be more 
rigorous, thorough, and may involve an officer making more intimate contact than 
before.84 
A. Fourth Amendment Challenges 
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.”85 
Courts commonly weigh three aspects of a search to determine whether the search is 
reasonable: the degree of intrusiveness of the search procedure; the magnitude and 
frequency of the threat; and the sufficiency of alternatives to conducting a search.86 
Courts also consider the effectiveness of the search in reducing the threat and 
whether sufficient care has been taken to limit the scope of the search as much as 
possible, while still maintaining this effectiveness.87 In order to be successful on a 
Fourth Amendment challenge, the injured party must prove that a search or seizure 
has been conducted by an agent of the government.88 
Once it has been determined that the government has conducted a search, the 
Fourth Amendment requires that the search must either have been supported by a 
warrant or the search must fit into a few “specifically and well-delineated 
exceptions.”89 Due to the obvious inability for TSA agents to obtain a warrant 
because of time limitations, airport security searches must fall under one of three 
established exceptions used in airport security: the administrative search exception, 
the stop-and-frisk exception, and the consent exception.90 
                                                          
82 Justin Bachman, U.S. Airport Pat-Downs Are About to Get More Invasive, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 3, 
2017, 2:25 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-03/u-s-airport-pat-downs-are-
about-to-get-more-invasive. 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
86 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Airline Passenger Security Screening: New Technologies and 
Implementation Issues 34 (1996). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
90 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 35. 
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Administrative searches are justified on the basis that they serve a societal 
purpose other than standard criminal law enforcement.91 In order for an 
administrative search to be justified the societal purpose must outweigh the privacy 
interests sacrificed.92 Once it is determined that the need outweighs the privacy 
concerns, it still must be proven that the special need could not be met in a less 
intrusive manner and that the search was truly made in pursuant to the societal need 
asserted.93 The societal need for increased screening is higher during times of danger, 
but even in times of peace the interest in protecting passengers from threats to their 
safety has been balanced in favor of the government.94 
On the passenger’s side, the court must consider the passenger’s expectation of 
privacy.95 A person’s expectation of privacy is subjective and determined upon a full 
analysis of the circumstances.96 Airline passengers likely have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy against being searched in an intrusive manner.97 Another 
factor in regards to a passenger’s right to be free from intrusion is the nature of the 
intrusion.98 Even when the search is for good reason, the United States Court of 
Appeals in Skipwith held that “the intrusion is not insubstantial. It is inconvenient 
and annoying, in some cases it may be embarrassing, and at times can be 
incriminating.”99 
To justify passenger screening technology, the screening must be such that the 
privacy of the individual is protected to the fullest extent possible.100 Current imaging 
technology could be considered unlawful if the government need for ensuring air 
travel security can be met through less intrusive means.101 In an effort to increase 
privacy, the TSA has implemented measures to minimize the appearance of 
nakedness, such as the use of generic outlines for all passengers. Additionally, the 
number of people having access to the image, the time the image is preserved, and 
                                                          
91 Id. 
92 Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
93 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 35. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
97 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 35–36. 
98 Id. at 36. 
99 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973). 
100 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 36. 
101 Id. 
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the uses of the data need to be limited to effectively meet the least intrusive means 
standard.102 
Just as the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches, 
it likewise protects citizens from unreasonable seizures.103 An individual is “seized” 
when his or her liberty is restrained through coercion, physical force, or show of 
authority.104 A person’s liberty is restrained when, under all of the circumstances, a 
reasonable person would not have felt free to ignore the presence of law enforcement 
officers and go about his or her business.105 Tim Cushing, a journalist from Techdirt, 
sat down with TSA agents to clarify what he heard while waiting to board a plane.106 
Cushing stated, “I started watching the TSA video that was running on the monitors 
overhead, and I was struck when the narrator said: ‘Once you enter the screening 
area, you will not be permitted to leave without TSA permission.’”107 In Cushing’s 
interview the agent told him, “that he wasn’t free to leave, but he certainly wasn’t 
being detained.”108 So if you are not free to leave and you are not being detained, 
what sort of constitution-free zone are you standing in when in line to be screening 
by airport security? The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
attempts to clear these murky waters with its opinion in United States v. Aukai.109 
On February 1, 2003, Daniel Kuualoha Aukai arrived at the Honolulu 
International Airport intending to take a Hawaiian Airlines flight from Honolulu to 
Kona, Hawaii.110 Because Aukai was traveling without an ID, he was subject to 
secondary screening, even though he passed the initial screening without triggering 
an alarm.111 Aukai was directed to a roped off area for secondary screening but 
complained that his flight was scheduled to leave in five minutes, and he could not 
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103 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
104 MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT 9.20 (2017). 
105 Id. 
106 Tim Cushing, The TSA Vs. The Fourth Amendment: You’re Free To Board A Plane, But You’re 
Not Free To Leave The Screening Area, TECHDIRT (Apr. 8, 2014, 8:52 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/ 
articles/20140406/09365326822/tsa-vs-fourth-amendment-youre-free-to-board-plane-youre-not-free-to-
leave-screening-area.shtml. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 2007). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
 
 
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XVIII – 2017-2018 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2018.217 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
wait for the additional screening.112 During the additional screening, the TSA officer 
could see the outline of an unknown object in Aukai’s pocket.113 At some point 
during the screening process, Aukai informed the officer that he no longer wished to 
board a plane and wanted to leave the airport.114 Eventually, Aukai removed the item 
from his pocket and it was discovered to be a glass pipe used to smoke 
methamphetamine.115 Aukai was placed under arrest and subsequently several bags 
of methamphetamine were also located on Aukai.116 Aukai later filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence, because he believed the search was unconstitutional.117 
The court held that airport screening searches are constitutionally reasonable 
administrative searches, because they are “conducted as a part of a general regulatory 
scheme in furtherance of the administrative purpose, namely to prevent the carrying 
of weapons or explosives aboard aircrafts, and thereby to prevent hijackings.”118 
Further, the court held that, 
the constitutionality of an airport screening search does 
not depend on consent, and requiring that a potential 
passenger be allowed to revoke consent to an ongoing 
airport security search makes little sense in a post-9/11 
world.119 Such a rule would afford terrorists multiple 
opportunities to penetrate airport security by electing not 
to fly on the cusps of detection until a vulnerable portal is 
found.120 
The court added that given that consent is not required, it makes little sense to 
predicate the reasonableness of an administrative airport screening search on an 
irrevocable implied consent theory.121 Rather, where an airport screening search is 
otherwise reasonable and conducted pursuant to statutory, all that is required is the 
passenger’s election to attempt entry into the secured area of an airport.122 The court 
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held that once you intend to enter a secured area of an airport you will no longer be 
allowed to leave unless granted permission by the proper authority.123 
The Aukai case begs a line of questioning: Where do we draw the line? At what 
point does a passenger intend to enter a secured area of the airport? Is it upon entering 
the parking lot? After dropping off your checked bags? Or while standing in line to 
be screened? The court in Aukai said that the line is drawn when the passenger places 
their items on the conveyor belt of the X-ray machine.124 However, the government 
contended during oral arguments that it would be constitutional for the demarcation 
to be drawn at an earlier point in time such as entering the screening line or the 
presentation of a boarding pass to a TSA officer.125 The court declined to answer that 
question, because it was not an issue before them in that case.126 Fourth Amendment 
challenges will continue to arise so long as searches and seizures occur in U.S. 
airports. 
B. Tort Law Challenges 
Tort rights are rights that individuals have against a wide variety of entities, 
such as private persons, business entities, and the government.127 Thus, privacy torts 
protect an individual’s privacy from other individuals, including government 
officials.128 A standard invasion of privacy statute is worded as such: “One who 
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.”129 However, ordinary inconveniences and annoyances facing modern 
society are not actionable.130 Passenger screening technologies that reveal personal 
details may allow individuals to sue for damages if they believe the information was 
used “improperly” or the search was conducted without sufficient justification or in 
an excessive manner or scope.131 
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A woman in Texas was inappropriately and embarrassingly searched by TSA 
employees and she succeeded in forcing the government to compensate her, based 
upon common law tort claims of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.132 John Banzhaf, a public interest law professor at George Washington 
University, says, “this settlement strongly suggests that the TSA can’t avoid such 
law suits by broad claims that federal law authorizing TSA searches completely 
overrides state law.”133 TSA employees in a position to operate the equipment and 
conduct the searches need to be aware of the necessity to protect individual privacy 
during airline security screening to minimize these types of claims. 
III. DEVELOPING TECHNOLOGY 
The TSA is attempting to introduce two new technologies intended to 
significantly speed up the screening process.134 At Phoenix Sky Harbor International 
Airport and Logan International Airport in Boston, computer tomography three-
dimensional (CT3D) bag screeners are being tested.135 These scanners create a clear 
picture of the contents of a bag and can automatically detect explosives.136 This 
scanner is similar to technology used in CT scanners used for medical testing.137 
Larry Studdiford, a security consultant for airports and the founder of Studdiford 
Technical Solutions, said, “[n]othing is 100 percent, but CT3D scanners give a much 
greater level of detail of what’s inside a bag than the current X-ray machines.”138 
Meanwhile, biometric fingerprint screeners are being tested at Hartfield-Jackson 
Atlanta International Airport and Denver International Airport.139 The fingerprint 
screeners compare passengers’ fingerprints with the ones they provide when they 
enroll in TSA PreCheck, and can pull up boarding pass information.140 Studdiford 
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has stated that fingerprint identification would someday eliminate the need for fliers 
to show their boarding passes or photo IDs.141 
A. Legal Concerns 
In 2011, the Electronic Privacy Information Center sponsored a conference on 
the screening techniques used by the TSA.142 The opening speaker was 
Representative Rush Holt, a democrat from the 12th District of New Jersey.143 Holt’s 
theme was that by subjecting passengers to intrusive screening the TSA is violating 
fliers’ privacy, hindering airline security, and subjecting travelers to unknown health 
risks.144 Holt is no longer a member of Congress, but at the time, was a senior 
member of the House Intelligence Committee and currently serves as the chief 
executive officer of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.145 In 
a letter Congressman Holt wrote to the TSA Administrator, John Pistole, Holt said: 
[w]hen Americans witness three-year-old children being 
aggressively patted down by TSA screeners, as was the 
case this month, our airline security screening system is 
broken. As a scientist and the chairman of the Select 
Intelligence Oversight Panel, I appreciate the challenges 
we face in trying to prevent terrorists from boarding 
American airliners. That same background also gives me 
an understanding of why TSA’s current obsession with 
fielding body imaging technology is misguided, 
counterproductive, and potentially dangerous.146 
Within the letter, Holt urges Pistole to consider the potential health effects of 
back scatter X-ray devices.147 He quoted Dr. David Brenner of Columbia University 
who has stated that the devices currently in use deliver to the scalp “20 times the 
average dose [of radiation] that is typically quoted by TSA and throughout the 
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industry.”148 According to Dr. Brenner, the majority of the radiation from X-ray back 
scatter machines strikes the top of the head, which is where 85% of the 800,000 cases 
of basal cell carcinoma diagnosed in the United States each year develop.149 
Additionally, a World Health Organization report revealed that millimeter waves not 
only heat the skin, but also damage eyesight and cause cancer, particularly cancer of 
the skin.150 The organization, The Truth About Cancer, suggests that to minimize 
your risk of developing cancer you should skip the full body scanner and opt for a 
pat down instead.151 The possibility of injuries to a traveler’s health by this sort of 
technology opens up the TSA to serious liability.152 
B. Privacy Concerns 
Increased security measures often directly correlate to a decreased lack of 
privacy.153 Adam Schwartz, a lawyer with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a 
nonprofit digital rights group, says that biometric recognition is a uniquely invasive 
form of surveillance.154 Schwartz says, “We can change our bank account numbers, 
we even can change our names, but we cannot change our faces or fingerprints. Once 
the information is out there, it could be misused.”155 Kade Crockford, the director of 
the Technology for Liberty Program at the ACLU, says that, “the biometric databases 
that the government is amassing are simply another tool, and a very powerful tool of 
government control.”156 The American Civil Liberties Union received over 900 
privacy complaints from airport travelers in just one month in 2010.157 
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IV. PITTSBURGH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT’S NEW POLICY 
Locally, Pittsburgh International Airport has received attention recently for the 
implementation of its new policy allowing the public to bypass airport security.158 
As of September 5, 2017 non-fliers are allowed to roam beyond security at Pittsburgh 
International as part of a test the airport developed with the TSA’s sign-off.159 
Visitors who check in at a dedicated counter on the airport’s third-floor ticketing 
level and show a driver’s license or passport can receive a complimentary 
“myPITpass.”160 Individuals under 18 will not be required to produce identification 
so long as they are accompanied by an adult.161 Anyone on the no-fly list will not be 
allowed, and everyone will still be required to go through TSA’s standard security 
procedures.162 
Pittsburgh is the first airport in the country to allow the public past airport 
security since September 11, 2001.163 The purpose of the change is to allow non-
flyers to accompany minors, the elderly, or those needing additional assistance to the 
boarding area and provide access to the restaurants and shops without buying a 
ticket.164 The chief executive of the Allegheny County Airport Authority, Christina 
Cassotis, sees the move as “a return to the good old days.”165 TSA spokesperson 
Michael England says, “the public will be extremely vetted and screened as if they 
were boarding a plane. All rules for carry-on luggage will also apply to those 
receiving the myPITpass.”166 Airport officials promise that this policy will not affect 
security line wait times for traveling passengers.167 
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This is not the only change being made to Pittsburgh International Airport. 
Cassotis has also proposed a new $1.1 billion airport terminal.168 Cassotis reasons 
that, “we want to make sure that we have the most efficient airport that we can for 
this community, and we’re meeting the needs of the future.”169 The new terminal will 
utilize biometric screening.170 Cassotis explains, “[t]hink of it like you’re walking 
down a hallway and there are ways that biometrics will measure whether or not you 
are a security threat, after you have turned over a whole lot of biometric information 
of course.”171 If all goes as planned, the new terminal is set to open in 2023.172 
If you were not skeptical of either of these policies in their isolation, perhaps 
the idea of the new technology and new policy being utilized together will make you 
uneasy. Now, even those who are not able to board a plane are searched, seized, and, 
in the future, required to submit “a whole lot” of biometric data in order to access 
the airside terminal of Pittsburgh International.173 Is having dinner at the TGI Fridays 
in Concourse D or browsing the fragrances at Hugo Boss in the Center Concourse 
worth the government’s seizure of the data produced by an iris or facial recognition 
scan? If and when Pittsburgh deploys these procedures together, the government will 
no longer be able to justify its invasive measures by showing that there is a significant 
need to prevent non-ticketed passengers from hijacking planes. 
Not everyone is onboard with Pittsburgh Airport’s new policy.174 A union of 
flight attendants have come out against the decision to allow non-ticketed passengers 
through TSA checkpoints, calling it a “bad idea” that sets a “terrible precedent.”175 
Bob Ross, the president of the Association of Professional Flight Attendants wrote, 
“[a]llowing the non-flying public to go through security for the sole purpose of 
shopping is a terrible precedent and an ill-conceived decision.”176 It could be 
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construed by some that, as evidenced by the new policies, Pittsburgh International 
Airport is setting a poor example by prioritizing profitability over safety. Others, like 
Cassotis, could find the new policies a refreshing return to less intrusive measures 
used in “the good old days.” 
V. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
The United States can look to other countries for inspiration in how to manage 
airport security. In Israel, security agents rely heavily on “behavioral profiling” in 
which officers at airports ask questions to scrutinize people to see how they 
behave.177 Passengers exhibiting suspicious behavior are then pulled aside for 
targeted interrogation and search.178 Profiling techniques are used at airports by 
every other security agency with great success.179 It can help determine, intelligently, 
which technology to use on which passenger.180 
Most experts advocate for use of full-body scanners or pat-downs as a 
secondary screening tools for passengers that arouse suspicion.181 The profiling must 
be conducted in a neutral manner that focuses on data such as how a passenger 
bought their ticket, their past travels, recent actions, and behaviors.182 These 
procedures have been successful despite the fact that no country in the world faces 
more terrorist threats than Israel and no airport in the world faces more terrorist 
threats than Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport.183 Raphael Ron, a former director of 
security at Ben Gurion calls the passenger-oriented security system more focused on 
the human factor, based on the assumption that terrorist attacks are carried out by 
people who can be stopped by the use of this simple but effected security 
methodology.184 Ben Gurion’s airport security is staffed by highly trained army 
graduates who have specialist skills in detection and interrogation.185 A method such 
as this, which focuses on human impulses and behavioral characteristics, could 
                                                          
177 Bajoria, supra note 157. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Bajoria, supra note 157. 
183 Daniel Wagner, What Israeli Airport Security Can Teach the World, WORLD POST, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/what-israeli-airport-secu_b_4978149.html (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2018). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
 
 
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XVIII – 2017-2018 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2018.217 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
improve security and dramatically reduce concerns over privacy if utilized in the 
United States. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If the TSA cannot demonstrate the necessity for AIT technology, then the use 
of this technology should be restricted to such an extent as to limit intrusion.186 Every 
day, TSA employees are conducting invasive searches ranging from patting down 
children as young as three-years of age to inflicting harmful radiation onto traveler’s 
across the nation.187 These procedures are systematically employed and yet our 
airports are far from secure.188 Normally this would beg the question, “what is a life 
of security worth if that life is overrun with constant invasions of privacy by the very 
government created to protect American security and privacy?”189 But in this case, 
we should ask: is the relinquishment of an essential liberty, to purchase a little 
temporary safety, worth its intrusion? If the price all Americans pay is not worth the 
collective reward a delicate balance must be achieved through other avenues. 
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